Extreme Departure: Not So Extreme in the Public Offering Context by Fata, Nicolette
Seton Hall University
eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship Seton Hall Law
2019
Extreme Departure: Not So Extreme in the Public
Offering Context
Nicolette Fata
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Fata, Nicolette, "Extreme Departure: Not So Extreme in the Public Offering Context" (2019). Law School Student Scholarship. 957.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/957
 1 
Extreme Departure: Not So Extreme in the Public Offering Context 
Nicolette Fata* 
I. Introduction 
On October 1, 2014, Robby Shawn Stadnick and numerous others purchased shares of 
Vivint Solar—a solar energy company with a lucrative business model—helping it raise more than 
$300 million in proceeds.1  Any reasonable investor would have expected his or her newly-
purchased shares to, at minimum, hold their value over time, but, in the ideal, increase in value so 
as to turn a substantial profit.  This, however, was not the case for Stadnick and others who 
purchased the 20,600,000 shares of Vivint Solar’s common stock that first Wednesday in October 
2014.2   
Much thought surrounds the valuation of shares in anticipation of a public offering.3  So 
when the price of Vivint Solar’s shares quickly dropped by more than 22%,4 a reasonable investor, 
such as Stadnick, would have justifiably been upset and concerned.  A reasonable investor would 
presumably have read the prospectus and registration statement of any company in which he or 
she was planning to invest, becoming intimately familiar with the company’s business model and 
financials and confirming that the stock valuation was reasonable and the shares were worth 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; A.B., Georgetown University. 
1 Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., Nos. 14-9283, 14-9709 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), 2015 
WL 8492757 [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint]. 
2 Id. at ¶ 1.  
3  Shayndi Raice, The Art of the IPO, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 12, 2012), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203922804578080763596406112 (noting that “[i]t’s a fine line.  
Price your shares too high, and you’ll collect a lot of money.  But the subsequent drop may alienate investors and 
demoralize your employees.  Price them too low and you’ll grab plenty of headlines as your stock soars on takeoff, 
but you’ve failed to raise nearly as much as you could have, and the initial buying frenzy may end up costing you 
some long-term investors.”). 
4 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1. 
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purchasing.5  A collective shareholder loss of $60 million is likely to shock an investor like 
Stadnick.6  
In the case of Vivint Solar, an investor, such as Stadnick, may not have predicted such a 
loss based on a normal reading of the prospectus and registration statement.  This is because the 
loss that Stadnick and other like-investors suffered was the result of a conveniently-timed public 
offering, taking place almost immediately prior to Vivint Solar’s release of its third quarter 
financial statements, which would show a dismal performance far greater than what a number of 
investors would have forecasted.7  An outcome of the sort that Stadnick and other Vivint Solar 
investors experienced begs the court for intervention.  Yet, for an issuing entity, it can be difficult 
to predict when it is necessary to disclose interim financial statements in anticipation of a public 
offering, as the circuits are split on the appropriate test for making that determination: the total mix 
test8 or the extreme departure test.9  This Comment will argue that the correct test courts should 
apply is the extreme departure test, expressed in Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp.10 
Both the total mix test and the extreme departure test are fairly straightforward and can be 
summarized somewhat simply.  The total mix test seeks to determine “whether there is ‘a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted [interim financial statements] would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of 
information made available.’”11  The extreme departure test, on the other hand, asks whether the 
                                                 
5 For an analysis on the reasonable investor and what is normally expected of him or her, see Tom C.W. Lin, 
Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2015). 
6 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1. 
7 Id. 
8 The total mix test is commonly known as the materiality test. Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 36 (2d 
Cir. 2017) 
9 Compare Id. (applying the total mix test), with Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying 
the extreme departure test). 
10 Shaw, 82 F.3d. at 1210. 
11 Id. at 37 (quoting DeMaria v. DeMaria, 318 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003)). 
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issuing entity was “in possession of nonpublic information indicating that the quarter in progress 
at the time of the public offering will be an extreme departure from the range of results which 
could be anticipated based on currently available information” in determining whether section 11 
liability is warranted due to the omission of interim financial statements within a prospectus, 
registration statement, etc.12 
This Comment will examine the peculiar and significant context of a public offering in 
determining whether courts considering section 11 liability should apply the total mix or extreme 
departure test for determining the materiality of omitting interim financial statements.  Part II of 
this Comment will provide the necessary background concerning section 11 of the Securities Act 
of 1933.13  Part III will present an overview of Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and Shaw v. Digital 
Equipment Corp. and the two different materiality tests that they applied, which created a circuit 
split (Circuit Split).  It will also argue that the extreme departure test should be the applicable test 
for determining materiality for purposes of section 11 liability.  Part IV will examine the policy 
implications underlining both tests.  Part V will argue that, moving forward, circuits should apply 
the extreme departure test because (1) it best accommodates the expectations of actual, rather than 
reasonable, investors; (2) it best fits with the existence of the insider-trading disclose or abstain 
rule; and (3) it best reconciles the need for a fiduciary duty in the context of insider trading with 
the nonexistence of such in a public offering.  Part V will also examine the remaining issues to be 
resolved in implementing the extreme departure test and concludes. 
II. Intra-Quarterly Disclosures, Section 11, and the Securities Act of 1933: When is 
Disclosure Required? 
 
                                                 
12 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012). 
13 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
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Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (‘33 Act), which governs the initial offering 
of securities, with the primary objectives of (1) ensuring that potential investors receive significant 
information—financial and otherwise relevant—regarding the securities to be sold in a public 
offering, and (2) eliminating all forms of fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in connection with 
such offerings.14  To these ends, the ‘33 Act requires issuing entities to register their securities 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); the provisions also generally require an 
issuer to disclose a description of its properties and business and the security to be offered, 
information concerning its management structure, and independently certified financial 
statements.15  As such, the registration requirement seeks to efficiently provide potential investors 
with a complete and accurate impression of the security to be offered.16   
Significantly, however, the SEC does not guarantee that the information issuing entities 
provide in their registration statements is, in fact, accurate. 17   Instead, the ‘33 Act provides 
investors with a private action to enforce section 11 for material misrepresentations and omissions 
in the registration statement, among other things.18  
Under section 11 of the ‘33 Act, issuing entities have a duty to disclose material 
information to potential investors in anticipation of a public offering.19  And, they may be liable 
for registration statements containing “an untrue statement of a material fact [or] omit[ting] to state 
a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
                                                 
14 The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-
lawsshtml.html (last visited April 19, 2018)(explaining that the ‘33 Act, “[o]ften referred to as the ‘truth in securities’ 
law . . .  has two basic objectives: [to] require that investors receive financial and other significant information 
concerning securities being offered for public sale; and [to] prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the 
sale of securities.”). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id.  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
19 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
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misleading[.]”20  An investor who bought shares—either at the time of a public offering or at a 
time reasonably related in time and reliance to the public offering—may bring a civil suit against 
the issuing entity for violating section 11 by omitting statements which would have been otherwise 
necessary to make the registration statement complete and not materially misleading.21     
Inherent in the federal securities law, however, is the notion that silence on the part of an 
issuing entity cannot be actionable when the issuer has no duty to disclose.22  Significant to the 
issue analyzed herein is the fact that “the mere possession of material nonpublic information does 
not create a duty to disclose it.”23  The context of a public offering, however, creates “a strong 
affirmative duty of disclosure” on the part of the issuer,24 generating some confusion for an issuer 
regarding what exactly its obligations are.  
Issuing entities can turn to case law for some guidance as to the types of information that 
must be disclosed.25  Clearly, silence where there is no duty to disclose is not actionable.26  But if 
an issuing entity does choose to disclose information though it has no legal duty to do so, the 
disclosure must be truthful and non-misleading.27     
Section 11 liability often arises out of an issuing entity’s failure to disclose information 
required under Items 303 or 503:28 Item 303 requires issuing entities to provide forward-looking 
                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Legal Information Institute, Securities Act of 1933, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_act_of_1933 (last 
visited April 19, 2018). 
22 Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir. 1996). 
23 Id. (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987). 
24 Id. (citing Ernst & Young v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).  
25 See J & R Marketing, SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 398 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77k(a), 
77l(a)(2) (2012); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 
1993)).  
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK §5:101 (2017-2 ed.). 
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projections concerning any information that they possess;29 Item 503 requires issuing entities to 
disclose the most significant factors that potentially render the offering risky.30  
Under Item 303, an issuer must disclose any information “that significantly or materially 
decreases the predictive value of [its] reported results.”31  An issuing entity’s internal forecasts are 
not considered to be material information giving rise to a duty to disclose.32  Such disclosure is not 
required because of the SEC’s apprehension that investors may misinterpret such information.33   
There are certain events, courts have noted, that would require an issuing entity to provide 
intra-quarter updates, however. 34   “[M]aterial forward-looking information regarding known 
material trends and uncertainties [must be] disclosed as part of the required discussion of those 
matters and the analysis of their effects.”35  Courts consider statements or omissions material 
where a reasonable investor would have considered such information in making a significant 
investment decision.36  The exact test for materiality, as has been presented and will further be 
discussed in Part III, differs amongst circuits.37  A duty to disclose, however, arises when an 
issuing entity’s financial predictions based on interim financial data “cease to be optical forecasts 
                                                 
29 J & R Marketing, SEP, 549 F.3d at 392. 
30 City of Roseville Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 426 n.34 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 
17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2011)). 
31 Oxford Asset Mgmt. Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2002); Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 
719 F.3d 1190, 1197–1203 (10th Cir. 2013). 
32 In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 487, 506–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Glassman 
v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 631 (1st Cir. 1996) (“Plaintiffs’ nondisclosure claims fail because they base 
their allegations solely on discrepancies between actual (but undisclosed) intra-quarterly information and [the issuing 
entity’s] undisclosed internal projections.”); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., Civil No. 96-1077-K, 1996 WL 881659, 
at *4 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (“[Issuing entities] have no duty to disclose intraquarter results, even if those results are lower 
than the company’s internal projections.”). 
33 In re Facebook, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 631. 
34 Id. 
35 Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations, Securities Act Release No. 33–8350, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,062 (Dec. 29, 2003). 
36 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161–62 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
37 See, e.g., Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2017); Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st 
Cir. 1996). 
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and instead become present knowledge[.]”38  Thus, the issue that interim financial statements pose 
to the inquiry discussed herein lies in the determination of whether they contain “material forward-
looking information regarding known material trends or uncertainties[].”39 
III. The Circuit Split 
This Part provides an overview of Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and Shaw v. Digital 
Equipment Corp., including the respective courts’ analysis of the relevant issues, including which 
test is to be applied in determining whether to invoke section 11 liability.  To reiterate, the two 
tests may be summarized as follows: the total mix test looks at the information that a prospective 
investor had at hand in the wake of the public offering to determine whether the quarter-end results 
of the issuing entity would have been predictable by a reasonable investor given what information 
was made available to them;40 The extreme departure tests looks at the information that the issuing 
entity had at hand for the quarter in which the public offering took place and seeks to determine 
whether that information would have indicated that the quarterly results would have been an 
extreme departure from prior predictions.41 
In light of the preceding discussion of the ‘33 Act and, particularly, section 11 liability, it 
is relevant to turn once again to the narrative that opened this Comment.  As mentioned earlier, 
                                                 
38 Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Securities Act Release No. 6711 52 
F.R. 13715, 13717 (Apr. 24, 1987) (“Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of presently known trends, 
events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking information may involve some prediction or projection.  The 
distinction between the two rests with the nature of the prediction required.  Required disclosure is based on currently 
known trends, events and uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects, such as: A reduction in 
the registrant’s product prices; erosion in the registrant’s market share; changes in insurance coverage; or the likely 
non-renewal of a material contract.  In contrast, optional forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a future 
trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known event, trend or uncertainty.”). 
39 In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 487, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
40 Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 37. 
41 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210. 
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issuing entities consider many options in valuing their impending stock issuance,42 including the 
timing of the public offering.43   
While most public offerings are strategically timed,44 the timing of Vivint Solar’s public 
offering was particularly deceptive.  Vivint Solar’s public offering took place on October 1, 2014, 
just one day after the end of its third quarter.45  As such, the quarter-end financial projections 
would have presumably been fairly concrete and only slightly speculative.46  On November 10, 
2014, forty days after its public offering, Vivint Solar released its financial results for the third 
quarter: a decrease in the company’s net loss by $28.6 million.47  This information had not been 
provided to the potential investors prior to the public offering.48  Vivint Solar’s stock thereafter 
lost value; shares that had been sold at $16 per share at the public offering dropped to $11.70 per 
share just forty-three days later.49   
A similar situation occurred twenty-one years earlier when investors purchased the debt 
and equity securities of Digital Equipment Corporation. 50   In that case, Digital Equipment 
Corporation scheduled its public offering to begin just ten days before the end of its third quarter 
and to close three days before the end of its third quarter. 51   Just three weeks later, Digital 
Equipment Corporation released its financial statements for the third quarter, demonstrating its 
                                                 
42 See Raice, supra note 3. 
43 For an overview of the factors and conditions issuing entities take into account when determining when to publically 
offer shares, see Simon Benninga, et al., The Timing of Initial Public Offerings, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 115 (2005) (analyzing 
“the optimal conditions for taking a company public”).  
44 Tom Farley, The Right Time to IPO, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/article/right-time-to-ipo.  
45 Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34. 
46 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 1. 
47 Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.  
50 Shaw, 82 F.3d. 
51 Id. at 1200. 
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largest loss in over three years.52  On that same day, its common stock value fell from $28.875 to 
$21.125.53   
While the course of events in Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and in Shaw v. Digital 
Equipment Corp. were very similar, the courts in the two jurisdictions applied different tests to 
determine whether the quarter-to-date financial information were material, and thus their omission 
from the registration statement actionable.54  The Second Circuit in Stadnick split with the First 
Circuit in Shaw on the issue of whether a failure to disclose interim financial statements may be a 
material omission giving rise to section 11 liability.55 
A. Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp. 
1.  Factual Background 
Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp. involved a dispute between preferred and common 
shareholders and Digital Equipment Corporation, its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO), and seven underwriting and investment banking firms.56  The plaintiffs 
sued the defendants under sections 11 and 12(2) of the ‘33 Act.57  With respect to their section 11 
claims,58 plaintiffs asserted that Digital Equipment Corporation’s management was aware and in 
possession of material facts relating to large-scale losses to be reported in its third quarter of fiscal 
year 1994, which the plaintiffs argued created a duty to disclose in connection with the public 
offering.59  Defendants responded by equating plaintiffs’ argument to an assertion that the issuer 
                                                 
52 Id.  
53 Id. 
54 Compare Stadnick, 861 F.3d (applying the total mix test), with Shaw, 82 F.3d (applying the extreme departure test). 
55  Cole Hamilton, Second Circuit Splits with First Over Securities Disclosure Test, (June 21, 2017) N.Y.L.J., 
http://newyorklawjournal.com/this-weeks-news/id=1202790829271/Second-Circuit-Splits-With-First-Over-
Securities-Disclosure-Test?mcode=1202615036097&curindex=2.  
56 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210.  
57 Id.  
58 This factual overview and analysis of the court’s reasoning is limited to a review of the section 11 claim only, as 
that is what is pertinent to the argument made herein.  
59 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200.  
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was required to release internal forecasts concerning the third quarter, and argued that such a claim 
was “untenable because the securities laws impose no duty upon a[n] [issuing entity] to disclose 
internal projections, estimates of quarterly results, or other forward-looking information.”60   
At the time, Digital Equipment Corporation was one of the largest computer hardware, 
software, and services suppliers in the world.61  Having gone public in 1966, by the early 1990’s 
it was earning roughly $14 million per year in revenue.62  In 1992, however, Digital Equipment 
Corporation suffered quarterly losses of $138.3 million in January and between $30–311 million 
in the succeeding months.63  The company underwent a massive overhaul of its operating and 
management structure, cutting 35,000 jobs and replacing its CEO,64 and incurred restructuring 
charges of approximately $3.2 billion for the years 1990–1992. 65   Notably, the company 
introduced a new, revolutionary product that jumpstarted its financial growth in February 1992.66 
It finally had a profitable quarter in mid-1993, announcing a net profit of $113.2 million.67  This 
success was unsustainable, as the company reported a loss of $72 million for the second quarter of 
1994.68   
Digital Equipment Corporation thereafter filed a shelf registration with the SEC, providing 
the company with the option of issuing a maximum of $1 billion in various debt classes and equity 
securities.69  The company began issuing stock on March 21, 1994, and ended its sale on March 
28, 1994, three days prior to the end of its third quarter.70  At an offering price of $25 per share, 
                                                 
60 Id. at 1202.  
61 Id. at 1199. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1199. 
66 Id. at 1200. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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the sale of the entirety of Digital Equipment Corporation’s depositary shares of preferred stock 
resulted in $387.4 million in proceeds for the corporation.71 
Digital Equipment Corporation announced its third quarter earnings less than three weeks 
after the close of its public offering.72  The reported loss was far greater than analysts’ expectations 
and was, in fact, its largest reported loss since fiscal year 1993’s first quarter.73  This announcement 
sent preferred stock prices plummeting from the offering price of $25 per share to $20.875 on 
April 15, and common stock prices fell from a high of $28.875 to $21.125 by the next trading 
day.74 
2.  The Court’s Reasoning 
In Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., the First Circuit analyzed whether Digital Equipment 
Corporation was legally obligated to disclose, in the registration statement, the imminent report of 
third quarter losses to investors.75  In sum, the First Circuit was uncertain as to the materiality of 
the information that Digital Equipment Corporation had in its possession at the time of the 
offering.76  Rather, it was unable to hold that Digital Equipment Corporation was not required to 
disclose material information concerning its third quarter interim financial statements. 77  
Ultimately, the First Circuit chose to apply the extreme departure test to the above-mentioned facts 
to determine materiality because “it is consistent with the basic statutory policies favoring 
disclosure to require inclusion of that information in the registration statement.”78  These statutory 
policies will now be discussed. 
                                                 
71 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1202. 
76 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1203. 
77 Id.  
78 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210. 
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i.  Insider Trading 
In its analysis, the First Circuit first undertook an insider trading analysis to compare the 
requirements of disclosure for an individual corporate insider in an insider trading case and a 
corporation on the brink of a public offering.79  The court “conceptualiz[ed] [Digital Equipment 
Corporation] (the corporate issuer) as an individual insider transacting in the company’s securities, 
and examine[d] the disclosure obligations that would then arise.”80  The court noted that the 
“disclose or abstain” rule, frequently applied to insider trading by individuals, is also applicable to 
an issuing entity trading in its own securities.81  The court expanded on this notion by saying that 
a rule comparable to disclose-or-abstain should be applicable to issuing entities engaged in the 
public offering of its own shares. 82   Otherwise, it noted, “a corporate issuer selling its own 
securities would be left free to exploit its informational trading advantage, at the expense of 
investors, by delaying disclosure of material nonpublic negative news until after completion of the 
offering.”83   
ii. Section 11 and SEC Policy 
The court then conducted a policy analysis regarding whether strong disclosure 
requirements, such as those that exist in the context of an individual corporate insider in an insider 
trading case, should also exist in the context of corporate issuers.84  The civil liability imposed by 
                                                 
79 Id. at 1203. 
80 Id.  The First Circuit provided several justifications for analogizing individual insider trading and corporate insider 
trading.  Id.  For more information concerning the court’s analysis, see VII LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1505 (3d ed. 1991) (“When the issuer itself wants to buy or sell its own securities, it has a choice: desist 
or disclose.”); 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION 
§3.02[1][d], at 5 (3d rel. 1994) (“Issuers themselves may buy or sell their own securities, and have long been hold to 
an obligation of full disclosure . . . .  Conceptually, extending the insider trading prohibition to instances of issuer 
insider trading makes perfect sense.”). 
81 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1203. 
82 Id. at 1204. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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section 11 ensures that issuing entities put forth full and complete effort in preparing their 
registration statements and ensuring that all required material information.85  Particular to Shaw is 
the fact that Digital Equipment Corporation prepared its public offering pursuant to SEC Form S-
3, which requires that the prospectus describe:  
any and all material changes in the registrant’s affairs which have occurred since 
the end of the latest fiscal year for which certified financial statements were 
included in the latest annual report to security holders and which have not been 
described in a report on Form 10-Q or Form 8-K filed under the Exchange Act.86   
 
The court noted that the entire point of the requirement of disclosing material changes under Item 
11(a) is to ensure that any and all necessary updates to the information that they were provided in 
the original SEC filings and the prospectus, even those concerning “known trends and 
uncertainties” concerning “net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.”87  Given 
the amount of information and the nature of such information that Digital Equipment Corporation 
had at hand during the days leading up to the end of its third quarter,88 it would have likely realized 
that this information would have indicated a financial performance differing from any predictions, 
or at least provided the company with some uncertainty as to its financial state. 
While Item 11(a) carries with it rather specific requirements, the general scheme of the 
federal securities laws also provides justification for utilizing the extreme departure test.89  The 
court noted that one of the primary goals of the securities laws is to uphold the principles of fairness 
                                                 
85 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012).  See also Legal Information Institute, supra note 21. 
86 Legal Information Institute, supra note 21, at 1205.. (quoting Instructions to Form S-3, Item 11(a)).  Note that those 
entities filing Form S-3 prior to public offerings are of the sort not required to file more broadly available forms, such 
as S-1 or S-K, and are therefore not required to include in its prospectus the information required under Item 303: the 
disclosure of “any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a 
material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.”  Id. at 1225 
n.9 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2017)). 
87 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1204; 14 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii). 
88 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200. 
89 Id. at 1207 (citing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) 
(“Together, the ‘33 Acts embrace a fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the 
philosophy of caveat emptor.”)). 
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and efficiency in the market.90  Coupled with the principles of fairness and efficiency is the notion 
that the market must be able to correctly align a stock’s price with its “fundamental value.”91  The 
court noted that the need for such reliable, firm-specific information is particularly strong within 
the context of public offerings, where prospective investors must rely solely on what is presented 
to them by the issuing entity, including stock price.92 
In conclusion, the court noted that, although an issuing entity may have fully complied 
with the periodic disclosure requirements of the ‘33 Act, there remains the possibility that other, 
undisclosed facts may be material and, therefore, would have mandated disclosure.93  While the 
court did reject the notion that an issuing entity must disclose certain facts in every situation in 
which its quarterly results may possibly be subpar and disappoint the market,94 it held that potential 
investors deserve to have the most relevant and up-to-date information available to them before 
making an investment decision. 95   In the case of Digital Equipment Corporation, the court 
concluded that its third quarter results presented “more than a minor business fluctuation . . . 
indicating some substantial likelihood that the quarter would turn out to be an extreme departure 
from publicly known trends and uncertainties[.]”96 
B. Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. 
Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. involved a dispute between stockholders who purchased stock 
of Vivint Solar, Inc. during its initial public offering (IPO), in which the plaintiffs alleged violation 
of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the ‘33 Act.97  Relying on Shaw, the plaintiffs argued that Vivint 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1207–08 (citing Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE 
L. J. 977, 988–89 (1992)). 
92 Id. (citing Kahan, supra note 91, at 1014–15). 
93 Id. at 1210. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.  
96 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1211.  
97 Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34. 
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Solar was required to disclose its interim financial statements for its third quarter, ending one day 
before its IPO, because it reflected an extreme departure from what was previously disclosed in 
the registration statement.98   
1. Factual Background 
Vivint Solar is a residential solar energy system company that, at the time of its IPO, was 
the second largest residential solar energy installer in the United States, possessing an 8% market 
share in 2013 and a 9% market share in 2014.99  Vivint Solar, significantly, operates on a unique 
business model, which is predicated on the continued ownership of the solar energy systems that 
it installs.100  This business model allows Vivint Solar to benefit from various tax credits and 
government incentives, which allows “[c]ustomers [to] pay no up-front costs and instead enter into 
twenty-year leases by which they purchase solar energy in monthly payments at approximately 
15% to 30% less than they would pay for utility-generated electricity.”101  Thus, Vivint Solar’s 
monthly revenue is generated solely by these customer payments.102 
Due to its business structure, Vivint Solar naturally incurs major up-front costs. 103  
Consequently, Vivint Solar has perpetually operated at a loss.104  To account for this, Vivint Solar 
uses an accounting system called Hypothetical Liquidation at Book Value (HLBV), which means 
that a shareholder’s ownership in the company is valued according to the balance sheet’s asset 
valuation for the company.105  Thus, the court noted that “[d]ue to Vivint[] [Solar’s] business 
model and HLBV method, the allocation of income (a net loss in each quarter during the relevant 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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period) between shareholders and [outside investors] may vary substantially from one quarter to 
the next depending upon (1) contributions by investors and (2) transfers of title to the funds that 
provided the requisite capital.”106  Hence, when presented with the information concerning Vivint 
Solar’s business model and accounting method, a prospective investor would have had to attempt 
to make sense of this complicated mix of factors to predict the success of Vivint Solar in the event 
that they choose to become stockholders.  Indeed, this would have been an arduous task for any 
investor that is not an institution. 
In anticipation of its IPO on October 1, 2014, Vivint Solar, in accordance with SEC 
regulations, issued a registration statement that included its financial statements for the preceding 
six quarters.107  The Second Circuit noted that the registration statement would have indicated 
overarching fluctuating net losses and even warned prospective investors of the potential impact 
its business and accounting models could have on the company’s income allocation amongst 
shareholders and outside investors.108  Vivint Solar sold 20.6 million shares of common stock 
during its IPO, raising a total of $300.8 million in net proceeds.109   
Stockholder turmoil, however, began forty days later when Vivint Solar released its third 
quarter financial statements, indicating that outside investor-attributable net loss decreased by 
$28.6 million, which substantially contributed to the decreased shareholder net income: a $40.8 
million decrease, to be exact.110  Accordingly, earnings per share fell to negative $0.45, which 
missed the mark of analysts’ projections by 143%.111  This naturally caused a decrease in Vivint 
Solar’s stock price, which ultimately fell 22.5% to $11.42 per share.112 
                                                 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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2. The Court’s Reasoning 
The court began by analyzing what the applicable test for determining the materiality of 
omitted interim financial information should be in the Second Circuit.113  It concluded that it 
should be the total mix test, based on DeMaria v. Andersen, decided by the Second Circuit in 
2003.114  The following subsection analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in DeMaria, which 
adopted and set forth the total mix test.115 
DeMaria v. Andersen concerned facts highly similar to those of Shaw and Stadnick.  In 
DeMaria, plaintiffs argued that the issuing entity—ILife—failed to include in its registration 
statement financial information for its first quarter, which ended at the end of March, the same 
month in which ILife filed its registration statement with the SEC.116  In arriving at its conclusion, 
the Second Circuit compared the situation in DeMaria to a case in which an issuing entity’s 
disclosure consists of both accurate and inaccurate information. 117   In essence, a registration 
statement that does not include interim financial information is, in fact, both accurate and 
inaccurate.  It is accurate in the sense that it provides all of the publicly available relevant financial 
information that it was required to disclose under SEC regulations; At the same time, it is 
inaccurate because other information exists and is known to the issuer that would change the results 
of the public information disclosed in the registration statement.  The Second Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court’s guidance in cautioning that “not every mixture with the true will neutralize the 
deceptive.  If it would take a financial analyst to spot the tension between the one and the other, 
whatever is misleading will remain materially so, and liability should follow.”118 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 36. DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2003). 
115 See generally DeMaria, 318 F.3d. 
116 Id. at 172. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. (citing Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991)). 
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Following that line of reasoning, the Second Circuit chose to utilize the test outlined by the 
Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.—the total mix test.119  In TSC, however, 
the Court was not addressing an alleged section 11 violation.120  Rather, the Court was presented 
with an alleged violation of section 14(a) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act) in 
TSC.121  As will be discussed at the end of this section, this comparison is not particularly sound.  
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit applied the total mix test in DeMaria because the Supreme Court 
had used the test to determine the materiality of omitted information—although not necessarily in 
the same context—in TSC.122   
3. Returning to the Court’s Reasoning in Stadnick 
The Second Circuit, in Stadnick applied the same—and, as will be argued, flawed—
reasoning for applying the total mix test, stating that “DeMaria rests upon the classic materiality 
standard in the omission context[] with which [the court] and most other courts are familiar.”123  
In further explaining its reasoning, the court noted that the extreme departure test applied in Shaw 
was too volatile and left too many questions open—such as metrics, the role of the reasonable 
investor, etc.—in determining whether an extreme departure had taken place.124  This argument 
will be discussed further in Parts IV and V.   
                                                 
119 Id. at 180.  See generally TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
120 TSC, 426 U.S. at 438. 
121 Id.  The ‘34 Act concerns empowering the SEC with broad regulatory powers over the entirety of the securities 
industry.  U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 14.  In providing so, the ‘34 Act “also empowers the SEC to require 
periodic reporting of information by companies with publicly traded securities.”  Id. 
122 TSC, 426 U.S. at 438.  It is necessary to note the analogy that the Second Circuit found in TSC, causing it to apply 
the total mix test.  This analogy comes, in large part, from the language of section 14(a) of the ‘34 Act, which states 
that proxy solicitations should not be “false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or [] omit[] to state any 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.”  Id.  (citing 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-9 (2017)).  Assumingly, the Second Circuit relied on this language in applying the total mix test to the facts 
in DeMaria. See DeMaria, 318 F.3d. 
123 Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 37–38.  
124 Id. at 38. 
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In the case of Vivint Solar, however, the Second Circuit concluded that the company’s 
registration statement included ample warnings for a prospective investor to conclude that such a 
result was possible.125  The court was also not convinced that a reasonable investor would have 
considered the omission material where it was privy to the information concerning Vivint Solar’s 
peculiar business model and accounting method.126 
C. Summarizing the Split 
In choosing to apply the total mix test, the Second Circuit turned to the Supreme Court’s 
use of the test in the context of omissions.127  The notable difference between the cases that 
DeMaria cites to in support of its adoption of the total mix test, however, are factually dissimilar 
to DeMaria and to Shaw and Stadnick.128  The cited cases involved violations of the ‘34 Act,129 
whereas DeMaria and Stadnick alleged violations of section 11 of the ‘33 Act.130  The position of 
the plaintiffs in the ‘34 Act cases131 and the position of the plaintiffs in the section 11 cases132 are 
significantly different, especially when considering the sentiments underlying corporate law 
theory. 
                                                 
125 Id. at 39 (“Vivint’s registration statement contained ample warnings and disclosures that explained shareholder 
revenue and earning fluctuations, namely that: (1) the peculiarities of its business model and the HLBV method render 
the metrics identified by Stadnick less probative of Vivint’s performance; (2) as a result, the income available for 
shareholders would likely fluctuate from quarter to quarter; and (3) Vivint anticipated its substantial operating losses 
to continue.”). 
126 Id. 
127 See generally id. at 37; DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 179; TSC, 426 U.S. at 438. 
128 DeMaria cites the following in support of employing the total mix test: TSC, 426 U.S.; Press v. Quick & Reilly, 
Inc., 218 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2000); In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig., 163 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1998).  DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 
180.  
129 See generally TSC, 426 U.S. at 437 (“A minority stockholder in an acquired corporation brought suit against the 
acquiring corporation and sellers of controlling interest in the acquired corporation, charging violation of the ‘34 Act 
and rules promulgated thereunder in regard to a joint proxy statement issued by the acquiring and acquired 
corporations.”); Press, 218 F.3d at 121 (“Investors brought suits alleging that broker-dealers defrauded them by failing 
to disclose receipt of fees from money market funds that firms selected for ‘automatic sweeps’ of plaintiffs’ uninvested 
funds.”); In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig., 954 F. Supp. 81, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Stock purchasers brought class action 
securities fraud suit against corporation, alleging that corporation made false or misleading statements regarding its 
ability to continue paying quarterly dividend in present amount.”).  
130 DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 172; Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2017).  
131 The “‘34 Act cases” refers to TSC, Press, and In re IBM.  
132 The “section 11 cases” refers to Shaw, Stadnick, and DeMaria. 
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The very dynamic of a publicly traded corporation underlines why shareholders deserve 
the most relevant information when deciding on whether to invest in a particular company.  Unless 
a shareholder owns shares in a closely-held corporation, his or her management role is slim.133  
Individually, a shareholder has an even less significant role in the corporation.134  Notably, a 
shareholder has no vote on matters that are fundamental to the company’s success: i.e., deciding 
on whether to issue more stock, deciding on whether to relocate the company’s operations, 
deciding on whether its CEO should be replaced, and deciding on most other day-to-day operations 
of the company.135  In that regard, holding a company’s omissions to a lower standard with respect 
to shareholder disclosure claims makes sense, as it is in line with the understood, and well-
established corporate management scheme.  Holding omissions to a lower standard in section 11 
cases where potential investors are involved is concerning, however, because of the limited 
decision-making role that they would have as actual shareholders if they did, in fact, choose to 
purchase shares.  Hence, deciding on whether to invest in a particular company is an important 
decision that potential investors must make as they are essentially placing their trust in that 
company to make the best business decisions and to operate in an efficient and profitable manner.   
There is also a fundamental difference in actions arising under the ‘33 Act and the ‘34 Act.  
The ‘34 Act governs after an investor has already made the decision to invest in a company.136  
The investor has already been convinced that he or she is investing in a good company and has 
already placed his or her trust in the company’s management.  At this time, after an investor has 
                                                 
133 WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 375–76 (2d ed. 2016) 
(noting that shareholders are only entitled to a vote on “(1) election and removal of directors; (2) amendments to the 
corporation’s charter; (3) shareholder (as opposed to board) initiated amendments to the corporation’s bylaws; (4) 
dissolution of the corporation; (5) a merger of the corporation, and (6) a sale of all (or substantially all) of the 
corporation’s assets” although the board may delegate other voting powers to the shareholders in its charter or bylaws).  
134 Id. at 378 (explaining that votes are often tied to shares and not shareholders). 
135 Id. at 376, 385; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016). 
136 U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 14. 
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become a shareholder, fiduciary duties come into place.137  Thus, a shareholder has recourse 
against director action that potentially was not in the best interest of the company.138  These 
fiduciary duties, including the duty to disclose, are not present when there is no relationship 
between a company and its prospective investors.139  Thus, it is even more important for a higher 
standard to be applied in the omission context where an issuing entity is not bound by any fiduciary 
duties and an investor, therefore, has no recourse other than section 11. 
Accordingly, this Comment argues that the Second Circuit, first in DeMaria and later in 
Stadnick, incorrectly ignored the unique context in which section 11 claims are brought compared 
to the context in which the total mix test has historically been used—in cases arising under the ‘34 
Act.  In light of the lack of fiduciary duties present at the time of a public offering, a higher standard 
for evaluating the materiality of omissions must be used.  As will be subsequently discussed, the 
extreme departure test represents that higher standard. 
IV. Policy Implications  
This Part presents the policy implications supporting the use of the extreme departure test 
for omissions in the public offering context.  As discussed infra in Part III, the lack of fiduciary 
duties and the importance of the public offering render it necessary to employ a higher standard in 
evaluating the materiality of omissions.  This must be reconciled with well-established law that 
“[a] duty to disclose ‘does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market 
information.’”140  Thus, this section seeks to reconcile the lack of fiduciary duties, particularly the 
                                                 
137 SJOSTROM, JR., supra note 133, at 429 (“corporate law imposes two broad fiduciary duties on directors: the duty 
of care and the duty of loyalty.”). 
138 Although most director decisions are subject to the business judgment rule, this rule presumes that the ‘33 Action 
that potentially violated a fiduciary duty was an informed action that was done in good faith and in the honest belief 
that such action was, in fact, in the best interests of the company.  Id. at 430. 
139 See Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (“the duty to disclose arises when one party has information ‘that 
the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between 
them.’”). 
140 Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235). 
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lack of a duty to disclose, with the implementation of a higher materiality standard for omissions 
in the context of public offerings. 
A. The Insider Trader vs. The Institutional Trader 
The Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United States, endorsed the notion of the disclose or 
abstain rule, which would require corporate insiders to “disclose material facts which are known 
to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and 
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.” 141   Issuing entities too may be 
considered insider traders.142  How is it, then, that an issuing entity in possession of interim 
financial data that may sway potential investors’ opinions of its company is not held to the same 
abstain or disclose rule, when it is on the brink of a public offering? 
Marcel Kahan argues that the disclose or abstain rule, along with other disclosure 
requirements, may promote the release of a greater quantity of information and more reliable 
information.143  This would, in turn, facilitate a more accurate assessment of stock prices that more 
closely relate to the stock’s fundamental value.144  In effect, the extreme departure test is an 
extension of the disclose or abstain rule—it promotes essentially the same thing: disclosure where 
                                                 
141 In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).  The Supreme Court affirmed the derivative of the disclose 
or abstain rule from this case.  Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227.  
142 See Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders: 
Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, 67 U. CINN. L. REV. 1129, 1178 (1999).  Insider trading liability for companies, 
however, concerns a company buying or selling its own shares and securities repurchasing. Id.  As such, it would not 
apply in the context of Shaw or Stadnick.  Id.  See also McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos., Inc., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“[An issuing entity] in possession of material nonpublic information, must, like other insiders in the same 
situation, disclose that information to its shareholders or refrain from trading with them.”); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, 
Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435–39 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating a corporation’s duty to disclose a merger to an employee cashing 
in his shares); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963) (holding that the duty to disclose material 
nonpublic information “appl[ies] not only to majority stockholders of corporations and corporate insiders, but equally 
to corporations themselves”); Green v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (“[T]here can be 
no doubt that the prohibition against ‘insider’ trading extends to a corporation.”).  
143 Kahan, supra note 91, at 985 (1992). 
144 Id. 
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the need to do so is vague or abstaining from issuing shares until that information has been timely 
released to the public. 
While imposing the disclose or abstain rule on issuing entities is virtually impossible due 
to the lack of any fiduciary duties owed by the issuing entity to the prospective investor,145 the 
public offering market should be a level playing field, just as the corporate repurchasing market 
is.146  The extreme departure test proposes a legitimate and viable solution to this issue.  The test 
would not, in effect, pressure issuing entities to disclose all, or even a large portion, of the interim 
information—financial or otherwise—to prospective investors.  Rather, issuing entities would be 
forced to disclose any interim information that they possess that would present an extreme 
departure from any known trends or uncertainties.  By definition, “extreme” signifies that the 
information would have to be “of the character or kind farthest removed from the ordinary[.]”147  
Thus, information that would indicate a slight stray from known trends or uncertainties—i.e., 
normal business fluctuations—would not meet this standard for materiality and may be omitted 
without incurring liability.  Only information that is significantly beyond what would be expected 
would rise to the “extreme departure” level.  Thus, uncertainty regarding whether such information 
would be “of the character or kind farthest removed from the ordinary”148 would arise in cases 
where the information is either extreme or near extreme.  The disclose or abstain rule would thus 
                                                 
145 See generally Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The Case of 
Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 723 (1999) (“In sum, although the insider-trading analogy suggests 
that there should be a duty to disclose material negative information as to interim operational results, it is unclear 
whether such an extension could fit within the existing structure of insider-trading law with its requirement that there 
be a breach of fiduciary duty (or a similar relationship of trust and confidence).  Further, to recognize a fiduciary duty-
based duty to disclose running from corporations to prospective shareholders would, in effect, produce a duty to 
disclose all material information in an offering because the nondisclosure of any material information would give rise 
to a claim that the company traded on material nonpublic information.  Such an expansion of the duty to disclose 
would, to a considerable extent, nullify the specific offering-based disclosure requirements of the Securities Act of 
1933.”). 
146 Note that the disclose or abstain rule applies to a company when it is buying or selling its own shares or participating 
in securities repurchasing programs.  Nagy, supra note 142.   
147 Extreme, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/extreme. 
148 Id. 
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be effectuated because issuing entities could face potential section 11 liability.  Normal business 
fluctuations naturally would not fall under this category of information, as they inherently cannot 
be considered extreme or even approaching extreme. 
B. Who Are Reasonable Investors, Actually? 
Another important policy implication to consider is the perspective of the reasonable 
investor.  Both the extreme departure and the total mix tests seek to determine whether an omission 
would be material to the reasonable investor.  Therefore, the better test would be able to account 
for the actual ability of the reasonable investor to consider the information that he or she is 
presented with in the prospectus and registration statement and predict the company’s future 
performance.  This section is meant to address the question posed by the Second Circuit in Stadnick 
regarding the implementation of the extreme departure test: namely, what is “the precise role of 
the familiar ‘objectively reasonable investor’ in assessing whether a departure is extreme[.]”149   
In a perfect world, the total mix test would be sufficient in catering to the needs of the 
reasonable investor.150  But when one looks to the reality of who the actual investor is, it is quite 
evident that there exists a significant disparity in terms of the reasonable investor recognized by 
the law and the average investor that exists in real life.151  A 2012 SEC study found that the average 
American investor did not possess basic financial literacy and thus did not have the ability or the 
                                                 
149 Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2017). 
150 “In terms of cognition, the reasonable investor is generally understood to be the idealized, perfectly rational actor 
of neoclassical economics.  The reasonable investor is presumed to operate rationally to maximize returns in the 
marketplace.  Prior to making investment decisions, the reasonable investor is capable of reading and comprehending 
all the noise and signals in the marketplace that encapsulate formal disclosures, economic data, market trends, 
senseless speculation, and irresponsible rumors.  As such, when given the requisite information, reasonable investors 
are able to properly price the risks and rewards of an investment.”  Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. 
L. REV. 461, 467 (2015).  
151 See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and 
Policy, 38 EMORY L. J. 1005, 1047 n.151 (1989) (“[E]conomists who assume that people are ‘rational’ decisionmakers 
have articulated highly sophisticated models that purport to make predictions of great exactitude.  In the real world, 
of course, people are not rational decisionmakers, and the economists’ models suffer accordingly.”). 
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necessary knowledge to safeguard him or herself from being a victim of securities fraud.152  Prime 
examples of this lack of financial literacy and ability to safeguard against fraud are the 2008 
financial crisis and the dot-com bubble.153  In the financial crisis, there is evidence that many of 
the defaulting borrowers who were issued subprime mortgages did not understand the borrowing 
terms and the complex payment structures attached to their mortgages and, in actuality, could not 
afford the incrementally-increasing payments.154  Even more concerning is the case of the dot-com 
bubble, where investors would jump at the opportunity to purchase securities even remotely 
concerning the Internet and would fail to consider other, more relevant factors, such as stock 
valuation.155  In fact, research has shown that there are many other factors that determine whether 
a prospective investor will choose to invest in a company other than his or her rational evaluation 
of that company’s ability to perform.  Tom C.W. Lin notes the following: 
Many investors, for instance, are motivated by irrelevant factors like sunlight, 
weather, and sleep when making investment decisions.  Irrational investors also 
chase fads and exhibit herd mentality with their investments.  Additionally, 
irrational investors frequently possess perilous amounts of optimism, confidence, 
and loss aversion that diminish their capacity to make the best investment 
decisions.156   
 
Accordingly, courts should not be as confident that the reasonable investor is actually reasonable.  
While there is a strong legal tradition in utilizing the reasonable person standard, there exists risk 
in relying on the reasonable investor standard in creating judicial tests in the financial context 
                                                 
152 Lin, supra note 150, at 469 (citing OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC. & EXCH., COMM’N, STUDY 
REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS 15 (2012)). 
153 Id. 
154 Gerald H. Lander et al., Subprime Mortgage Tremors: An International Issue, 15 INT’L ADVANCES ECON. RES. 1, 
4 (2009) (“Numerous borrowers say they didn’t understand the loan structure and the escalating payments; in many 
cases, they couldn’t afford them.”). 
155 Lin, supra note 150, at 469.  See also David Kleinbard, The $1.7 Trillion Dot.com Lesson, CNN MONEY (Nov. 9, 
2000, 5:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2000/11/09/technology/overview/ (“The collapse of the Internet bubble, 
perhaps one of the largest financial fiascoes in U.S. history, came after a three-year period, starting in January 1997, 
when investors would buy almost anything even vaguely associated with the Internet, regardless of valuation.  
Investors ignored huge current losses and were willing to pay 100 times expected earnings in fiscal 2002.  They were 
goaded by bullish reports from sell-side securities analysts and market forecasts from IT research firms[.]”). 
156 Id. at 470.   
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because of the market consequences that potentially may occur and, historically, have regularly 
occurred. 
Applying the actual reasonable investor standard to facts similar to those of Shaw and, 
particularly, Stadnick is a daunting task.  The term “actual reasonable investor” refers to the typical 
investor who, according to Lin, lacks financial literacy, is vulnerable to trends, and often acts on 
impulse or other external motivators. 157  Shaw presented investors with a tricky analytical situation 
in which predictions concerning the company’s profitability and future success could have gone 
either way.  Stadnick, however, presented investors with information that was difficult to digest 
and analyze.  Although, in theory, the information was present for prospective investors to make 
an accurate prediction of Vivint Solar’s future success, an actual reasonable investor would not 
have been able to easily interpret the effects of its complex accounting methods combined with 
front-loaded losses.  As such, the total mix of information available to investors would be assessed 
differently depending on the investor’s level of financial sophistication.  An institutional investor 
would have been able to see, from the total mix of information available, that there was a real risk 
of loss.  But an individual who trades from an online brokerage account likely would not be able 
to arrive at the same prediction because he or she would lack the perspective to adequately analyze 
the total mix of information available to him or her.158  
                                                 
157 See Lin, supra note 150, at 471 (“[U]nlike the reasonable investor, who lives in a simple, perfectly efficient world 
populated only with other perfectly informed, rational characters, the irrational investor inhabits a complicated world 
populated with other flawed, complex characters—the real world.  Optimal investment decisions and sustained 
investment success are much more difficult to model and predict in the real world.  As Isaac Newton noted after 
suffering large losses during the South Sea Bubble of 1720, ‘I can calculate the motion of heavenly bodies but not the 
madness of people.’”  Id. 
158 “A diverse population of investors necessarily means that investors having asymmetrical information, varying 
sophistication, and disparate resources exist in the market. . . .  After all, it is difficult to believe that investment banks 
and hedge funds, with armies of research analysts, sophisticated forecasting models, and high-speed trading platforms, 
are investing on the same level as the average investor who simply watches CNBC, reads The Wall Street Journal, 
and trades with his online brokerage account.”  Id. at 484. 
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Assessing the materiality of an omission should account for the disparity of investors’ 
intelligence and sophistication along with the resources available at their disposal.  The total mix 
test does not recognize this disparity.  Because the reasonable investor standard is calibrated more 
toward an institutional investor, this standard would basically render an omission material only if 
an institutional investor would have seen the omitted information as altering the total mix of their 
forecasted conclusions concerning the company’s performance abilities.  The total mix of 
information that an actual investor would garner from that same information is lacking due to the 
inability of an actual investor to fully understand, comprehend, and analyze such information.159  
Accordingly, a higher standard must be utilized so as to account for this disparity.  The extreme 
departure test would be capable of doing so because it would ensure that the omitted material was 
presented to prospective investors in more cases than would the total mix test.160   
V. Conclusion 
This Comment has argued that the applicable test to be applied in determining the 
materiality of an omission in the public offering context should be the extreme departure test.  
While the total mix test may be appropriate in determining the materiality of other omissions or 
information generally, the peculiarity of the public offering context warrants the imposition of a 
higher materiality standard.  Furthermore, the implementation of the extreme departure test would 
result in disclosure in more cases than the total mix test, thus implementing a quasi-disclose-or-
                                                 
159 Lin cites multiple studies that reveal that actual reasonable investors are incapable of “beating the market” by 
conducting individual research and trading.  Id. at 486.  Those studies include the following: Brad M. Barber & 
Terrance Odean, Online Investors: Do the Slow Die First?, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 455, 785–88 (2002); Nicolas P. B. 
Bollen & Jeffrey A. Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 594–95 
(2004); Ronald C. Lease et al., The Individual Investor: Attributes and Attitudes, 29 J. FIN. 413, 429–31 (1974); Don 
A. Moore & Terri R. Kurtzberg, Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, 79 
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 95, 110–12 (1999); Felix Salmon, Stop Selling Bonds to Retail Investors, 
35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 837, 837 (2004). 
160 This Comment does not argue that a subjective investor test should overtake the objective reasonable investor 
test.  It does, however, argue that courts’ understanding of whom a reasonable investor constitutes should change to 
better reflect the vast majority of investors—the actual reasonable investors. See See Lin, supra note 150, at 471 
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abstain rule on issuing entities offering shares through a public offering.  It would also reduce the 
advantage of institutional investors over individual investors—an advantage that is due to the 
disparity in financial literacy, sophistication, and resources between the two groups.  Additionally, 
it would work hand-in-hand with the pull of the market in attempting to ensure that stock valuation 
best matches fundamental value.   
Like the total mix test, the extreme departure test still safeguards the issuing entity from 
the threat of overwhelming liability.  The extreme departure test would only mandate disclosure 
when the omitted information would cause an extreme or near extreme departure from a known 
trend or risk.  Although more case law would have to be developed to refine the terms of what 
would define an extreme departure, issuing entities still have clarity in their obligations: extreme 
is a “fairly significant departure,”161 and the step below extreme would be a somewhat significant 
departure.  Thus, disclosure would be necessary only in cases that depart from regular business 
fluctuations while still mandating more disclosure than the total mix test.162   
It is necessary to note, however, that courts would still need to determine the metrics for 
determining an extreme departure.163  Metrics for determining an extreme departure are very much 
dependent on the facts of each particular case.  What constitutes an extreme departure for one 
issuing entity may not be an extreme departure for another issuing entity.  Even in light of the fact-
sensitive inquiry that must take place in applying the extreme departure test and the uncertainty 
that this may present issuing entities, it cannot be concluded that the extreme departure test would 
have negative implications on equity and fairness.     
                                                 
161 DICTIONARY.COM, supra note 147. 
162 The total mix test would not warrant disclosure of an extreme departure from a known trend or risk if a reasonable 
investor could likely have predicted the possibility of that outcome actually occurring.  The extreme departure test 
would warrant disclosure even when the total mix of information could have led the reasonable investor to predict that 
outcome.   
163 See Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2017) (asking “which metrics courts should look to 
in assessing whether such a departure has occurred” in applying the extreme departure test). 
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Not only will investors benefit from a higher materiality standard in the context of public 
offerings, but so too will the market.  Stock prices are often incongruent with their fundamental 
value because of one or more of the following reasons: “lack of information, misassessment of 
information, speculative trading, and liquidity crunches.”164  The first three reasons are implicated 
by the omissions of the sort in Shaw and Stadnick.  Hence, a materiality standard that induces 
issuing entities to disclose more information would benefit the market by ensuring that stock prices 
are more accurate.   
The focus then shifts to enforcement.  The ability of courts, or even the SEC, to enforce 
such disclosure requirements is often doubted.165  While courts and the SEC may undoubtedly play 
a role in enforcement, it is the market itself that has the ability to force compliance with the 
disclosures required under the extreme departure test.166  And, indeed, the market has a reason to 
force compliance because of its inherent struggle to achieve equality.  Therefore, the extreme 
departure test is courts’ best attempt to implement a disclosure obligation that complements the 
market’s disclosure demands.  Together, the two may react to decrease the disparity between an 
issuing entity’s stock valuation and that stock’s fundamental value.   
In a society still recovering from the latest financial crisis, courts must take responsibility 
in strengthening the statutory safeguards in place so as to avoid the perils of the past.  What the 
market and investors need is transparency.  What the issuing entities need is a stronger market with 
more investors.  Adopting the extreme departure test in the context of omissions in the context of 
                                                 
164 Kahan, supra note 91, at 988. 
165 “[C]ompanies and their lawyers will no doubt ask: (1) Does this new duty mean that when we do offerings we will 
have an affirmative duty to collect our intraquarterly information and examine it to see whether or not it is material?  
(2) What if we, for internal cost-related reasons, do not collect and evaluate information until the quarter is over?  (3) 
Does this obligation apply only to end-of-quarter offerings?  (4) Are we exempt if we time our offerings to be at the 
beginning of a quarter?”  Mitu Gulati, supra note 145, at 729 (1999).  
166 See id. at 690 (“Because the market itself disciplines firms, through the imposition of nonlegal sanctions such as 
reputational costs, the creation of legal sanctions is largely unnecessary to force appropriate disclosures and, in fact, 
is positively detrimental to a well-functioning market—witness the phenomenon of frivolous ‘strike suits.’”). 
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public offerings has the potential to benefit all parties with proper implementation.  The total mix 
of information points to the overwhelming benefit of the extreme departure test.  
